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ABSTRACT: The explosion of interest in consciousness among scientists in recent decades has 
led to a revival of interest in the work of Whitehead. This has been associated with the 
challenge of biophysics to molecular biology in efforts to understand the nature of life. Some 
claim that it is only through quantum field theory that consciousness will be made intelligible. 
Most, although not all work in this area, focusses on the brain and how it could give rise to 
consciousness. In this paper, I will support this challenge, but I will suggest that the focus of 
work in this area reflects the failure to fully overcome the assumptions of Cartesian thought, 
associated above all with a defective understanding of consciousness as a ‘thinking substance’. 
Firstly, as Bergson, Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty argued, consciousness is embodied. 
Secondly, as Jacob von Uexküll argued, consciousness is only comprehensible in relation to the 
organism’s world defined as such by the organism. Thirdly, in the case of humans, this is a 
‘with-world’, a world shared with others. The consequent social nature of human consciousness 
is better captured by the German word for mind: Geist, which also translates as ‘Spirit’. And as 
Hegel argued, along with Subjective Spirit, there is also Objective Spirit, the realm of 
institutions, and Absolute Spirit, the realm of culture, with Subjective, Objective and Absolute 
Spirit being conditions, and even components, of each other. My argument is that this broader 
notion of mind as Spirit should be embraced, but without abandoning the work in biophysics. 
What is required is a further expansion of the notion of mind and Spirit as humanity comes to 
appreciate that it is part of nature and that it is through the development of institutions and 
culture that nature, through human subjects, is becoming conscious of itself and its significance. 
The development of process philosophy inspired by Whitehead, associated with the 
development of the concepts of field and ecology, should be seen as a development of the 
semiosphere and the advance of the Spirit of Gaia, essential for the creation of a global 
civilization able to augment the life of the current regime of the global ecosystem of which we 
are part. It is to orient humanity to create an ecologically sustainable civilization; an ecological 
civilization. 
KEYWORDS: Process Philosophy; Philosophy of Mind; Quantum Field Theory; Neurophysics; 
Jacob von Uexküll; Hegel 
 
1 This is a slightly revised version of a paper presented at the 11th International Whitehead Conference 
held in the Azores in July, 2017. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There has been a spectacular growth in consciousness studies over the last two 
and a half decades. This follows the setting up of the Journal for Consciousness 
Studies in 1994, coinciding with the first of the Toward a Science of  Consciousness 
conferences organized by the Center for Consciousness Studies of the University of 
Arizona. The cross-disciplinary nature of these initiatives brought into focus the 
massive problem of the unintelligibility of consciousness from the perspective of 
mainstream science, famously designated by David Chalmers (1995) as the hard 
problem of consciousness.  Some of the impetus for this project came from the 
work of Roger Penrose, whose book The Emperor’s New Mind published in 1989 
attacked the computational model of consciousness and argued that quantum 
theory could play an essential role in human thought, a theory he further 
defended in Shadows of  the Mind published in 1994. With Stuart Hammeroff, he 
aligned himself with Whitehead on the grounds that Whitehead’s actual 
occasions can be identified with quantum events (Hammeroff and Penrose, 
2000, 177). An interview with Penrose was included in the first edition of the 
Journal of  Consciousness Studies. This growth has helped advance other work 
grappling with this problem. This has helped inspire the transnational 
interdisciplinary conferences devoted to explaining mind through quantum 
physics led by Seán Ó Nualláin, the proceedings of which have been published 
in Cosmos & History. Phenomenologists and post-phenomenologists, whose work 
had been focussed on characterizing consciousness, but who appeared to be a 
spent force, have revived with efforts to naturalize phenomenology (Kauffman 
and Gare, 2015). Given its original impetus through the work of Francisco 
Varela, it spawned the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, first 
published in 2002. Peircian semiotics has received a huge boost from the 
development of biosemiotics attempting to conceive nature in such a way that 
human thought can intelligible be conceived of as part of it. To advance this, 
the journal Sign Systems Studies was published in English in 1998 and the journal 
Biosemiotics established in 2008. More radical scientists such as David Bohm and 
Basil Hiley are again being looked at. And there has been such a renewed 
interest in the work of Alfred North Whitehead. Henry Stapp has used 
Whitehead to interpret quantum theory to show that what we experience are 
quantum mechanical processes (2017, 25f.). Mae-Wan Ho, who aligned her 
work in theoretical biology with the philosophy of Whitehead and Bergson, 
argued that organisms are quantum coherent liquid crystals, and this accounts 
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for their consciousness. Whitehead has been taken up within science so 
enthusiastically that someone complained in an email that now one only has to 
mention Whitehead in a scientific paper to get it accepted for publication. 
To process philosophers, this looks like a welcome development. After all, 
the recognition that mainstream science had rendered consciousness 
unintelligible has always been central to the whole project of process 
philosophy, one of its defining features. Now, it appears, process philosophy 
might be taken seriously by mainstream philosophers. However, this attention 
to consciousness also raises suspicions. Why were consciousness studies taken 
up so vigorously at this particular time by mainstream philosophers when in the 
past concern with consciousness had been treated with suspicion; a sign of some 
form of soft-headedness associated with Idealism and continental philosophy? It 
is reminiscent of the development of complexity studies. This also was 
welcomed by radical thinkers who had been opposing the reductionism of 
scientific materialism, and many, such as C.H. Waddington and Brian 
Goodwin, aligned their work with the science of complexity. However, on 
examination, it was clear that Warren Weaver, who in a lecture in 1947 called 
for the study of complexity as the last frontier of science, really meant the last 
frontier of reductionist science. Norbert Wiener (1952, p.44), the founder of 
cybernetics, whose ideas were taken up by complexity theorists, in the first 
chapter of his famous book on cybernetics discussed the challenge to scientific 
materialism posed by Bergson, and concluded that cybernetics should really be 
seen as the triumph of scientific materialism. Cybernetics underpinned Pitts 
and McCulloch’s work on neural networks which later became a major 
component of complexity science, particularly as this was applied to 
neuroscience, again, as a way of advancing scientific materialism. The turn to 
consciousness studies could be seen as a further effort to advance scientific 
materialism without abandoning the assumptions that underpinned the 
scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, that is, the Newtonian 
paradigm. It could be argued that it was for this reason that the work of Roger 
Penrose was embraced. As Penrose made clear in The Road to Reality (2004, 9ff.), 
he was defending the view that reality is essentially that which can be grasped 
through mathematics. He was merely defending more advanced forms of 
mathematics to achieve this. What becomes evident is that there is still a divide 
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between those theorists still working within the framework of deep assumptions 
of modern science and those struggling to overcome these assumptions, and the 
former still dominate science, and most scientists refuse to take seriously the 
work of those challenging these assumptions. 
There are a number of effects of this discrimination against more radical 
scientists. Often it means their achievements are ignored, to the detriment of 
science. Even among these radicals, because of the conditions they work under 
(their academic positions are less secure and they have more difficulty obtaining 
funding for their research) they are often unaware of work done elsewhere that 
complements and could advance their own work. There is a bigger problem 
particularly relevant to process philosophers; science continues to impose a 
fundamentally defective view of what humans are and what is their place in 
nature, reinforcing a defective culture that is maintaining the trajectory of 
humanity to global ecological destruction. This is particularly evident when it 
comes to conceiving of consciousness, or more broadly, the mind. While 
acknowledging the deficiencies of both mechanistic accounts of consciousness 
as computing with algorithms and Cartesian dualism, the enormous amount of 
work of philosophers and anti-reductionist psychologists in developing our 
understanding of mind, from Leibniz’s critique of Locke through the work of 
Vico, Kant and Herder, neo-Kantian and post-Kantianism, Idealism, process 
philosophy, pragmatism, phenomenology and post-phenomenology, has largely 
been ignored by most of these new scientists of consciousness, with some 
notable exceptions (see Kauffman and Gare, 2015). This does not mean that the 
work of these scientists is of no importance, but from the perspective of process 
philosophy, not only does their work appear to be distorted by their 
assumptions, but there is a distortion in which work is embraced and integrated 
and which marginalized.  
I believe the best way to understand this situation, which I will try to show 
in this paper, is to appreciate the fundamentally different research programs 
involved in consciousness research. One still grounded in Newtonian 
assumptions, strives to explain more and more through these assumptions with 
minor modifications, extending this research program from physics to 
chemistry, and then to biology, and now, meeting the greatest challenge of all, 
to neuroscience to make consciousness intelligible. The other research program 
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developed through the focus on the mind. Problematized by the development 
of the mechanistic world-view and the impoverished conception of mind that 
accommodated itself to mechanistic thought, developed by first ignoring the 
advances in the natural sciences or denying their significance in order to do full 
justice to the reality of the mind. The full development of this research program 
involved challenging the natural sciences and demanding a radical 
reformulation of these to accord with advances in our understanding of mind. 
This I believe is the essence of process philosophy, and it is this research 
program which I will focus upon, not only because this is necessary to 
understand advances in our understanding of mind that many neuroscientists 
are overlooking, but it is necessary to understand the main advances in the 
natural sciences relevant to neuroscience. 
MIND AND SPIRIT 
While Descartes dealt with mind by treating it as a thinking thing, it was 
Hobbes who extended the mechanistic world-view to characterized humans 
and their minds mechanistically, arguing for an atomistic view of society and 
treating people as calculating machines moved by appetites and aversions and 
thinking as a mechanical organization of images, a view embraced and 
elaborated by John Locke. Thought was characterized by Hobbes as a 
mechanical process of adding and subtracting in the service of controlling the 
world, with language and science also characterized from this perspective as 
means for gaining and communicating instrumental knowledge (Hobbes, 
chap.5). It is surprising how little mainstream reductionist psychology has 
advances since then.   
Reactions against this have involved efforts to recover the superior ideas 
about humanity developed by the ancient Greeks and Romans, medieval and 
Renaissance philosophers, but also involved creative efforts to deal with 
phenomena revealed by the inadequacy of mechanistic thinking. There were 
two inter-related aspects to this. One involved developing an appreciation of 
the creative imagination, the other, appreciating that humans are essential 
social beings largely formed by their cultures. While the English and to some 
extent the French developed mechanistic models of the mind under Locke’s 
influence and developed their understanding of the mind as an association of 
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ideas understood as images, Giambattista Vico, who died in 1744, reacted 
against Descartes’ and Hobbes’ philosophies by portrayed the imagination as 
essentially creative and central to all aspects of human life, including the 
formation of civilization (Vico, p.18ff.). Imagination, he argued, is essentially 
social, as are people. On this basis he defended the primacy of the study of 
human history over the study of nature because, as he argued, we are the 
creators of history and we can only truly understand what we have made. It is 
for this reason that mathematics is comprehensible. Nature, on the other hand, 
was made by God, and only God can fully understand it. What the weak 
influence of Vico at the time shows is how difficult it was to break through the 
orthodoxies of the time.  
Through most of its history although not all of it, Germany has been far 
more receptive to such ideas than Anglophone countries. Virtually any history 
of social thought reveals the bias towards mechanistic and atomistic thinking 
about society in Anglophone countries, and the challenges to this primarily 
although not always from German thought. This is evident in the place 
accorded imagination, as shown by James Engell’s magisterial study, The 
Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism (1981). Descartes regarded 
imagination as of no importance in gaining knowledge except as an obstacle to 
clear thinking. Hobbes gave imagination a place in the mechanics of calculative 
thinking. Locke conceived thought as an essentially mechanical or chemical 
interaction of ideas understood as sense-impressions and their copies, a view 
that inspired the associationist theory of thought, taken up by a number of 
philosophers in Britain and France, most importantly, David Hume. While 
various English and French philosophers came to appreciate that the 
imagination was far more important than this, it was only in Germany that this 
view came to dominate. 
 The crucial figure here was Kant, although Kant can only be fully 
understood in relation to Hume. Hume was also influenced by the 
associationists, but saw a role for imagination. He argued that our perception of 
the world is fleeting, partial, constantly changing, and yet what we experience is 
a stable, clear, constant image of the world. How is this possible? Hume, while 
strongly influenced by Locke, reluctantly concluded that this crucial role at the 
very foundation of our mind's functioning was performed by the imagination. 
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Kant, influenced by Leibniz’s criticisms of Locke, had taken this argument 
further, arguing that "impressions" are perceived as already organized and 
structured by the imagination. We do not need to see the imagination as 
somehow creating coherent images out of incoherent perceptions. Imagination 
is pushed to perform the even more fundamental task of providing the prior 
structuring of our perceptions. That is, what we can perceive, and know, is 
predetermined by our imagination. Consequently, we cannot know the world 
as it is in itself, the noumenal realm, independently of any cognition. In making 
judgements, this experience is further organized by the forms: space and time, 
and concepts or categories of understanding. These concepts are schematized 
and applied through imagination to objects of sensibility, and then the rule for 
doing this applied to other objects. The objects of sensibility become symbols of 
the latter objects. This is all anchored by the soul (Gemüt), a corporeal 
awareness of sensation and self-affection, which is both the recipient of 
representations and that which gains knowledge through these representations. 
However, while the soul in this sense is central to Kant’s philosophy, he was not 
sure of the grounds for accepting its reality. As he wrote in the the Criticism of  
the third paralogism of  transcendental psychology of the first Critique, ‘in the soul we 
encounter no persisting appearance other than the representation “I,” which 
accompanies and connects all of them, we can never make out whether this I (a 
mere thought) does not flow as well as all the other thoughts that are linked to 
one another through it (Kant 1998, p.424 (A364)). 
It is impossible to understand subsequent philosophy except in relation to 
Kant’s work, beginning with his students, Herder and Fichte (Gare, 2017a, 
ch2.). While Herder was an early student of Kant, Fichte was his student while 
Kant was expounding his critical philosophy. Fichte’s ideas were a direct 
development of Kant’s mature work, and departed from Kant in three ways. 
To begin with, Fichte rejected any reference to the noumenal realm of things in 
themselves, and embraced Idealism. Secondly, he argued that we can 
understand how concepts emerge through the dialectical development of 
consciousness, arguing that we are first of all active agents, and concepts 
emerge in the process of meeting and attempting to overcome felt resistances to 
our wills. Thirdly, he argued that the enduring self-conscious ego develops as 
such through relations to others whereby we look at ourselves from the 
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perspective of others. We, as conscious beings are essentially social. This is the 
basis of the dialectic of recognition central to the ethical and political order of 
society.  
An older student of Kant, Herder had argued that we are essentially 
cultural beings, the products of history, defending ideas similar to those of Vico. 
Building on Fichte’s work, but also influenced by Herder, Hegel argued that 
there are three dialectics through which people transcend the immediacy of 
their engagement in the world and participate in mind or Spirit (Geist), the 
dialectic of recognition that operates through ethical forms, the dialectic of 
representation that operates through language, and the dialectic of labour that 
operates through tools (Gare, 2017a, p.163 & 167ff.). It is through such 
participation that the subject takes the perspective of the universal, 
transcending its egocentricity, and becomes an ‘I’ among other ‘I’s’, achieving 
self-conscious as a participant in society and history. Subsequently, Hegel 
argued that Spirit has a further three dimensions, Subjective Spirit associated 
with the development of individuals, Objective Spirit consisting of institutions, 
and Absolute Spirit through which people come to comprehend the world and 
themselves through art, religion and philosophy, which for Hegel, included 
what we now call science.  
Influenced by Herder and Goethe as well as Fichte and while originally 
aligned with Hegel, Schelling rejected Fichte’s and Hegel’s Idealism and 
argued that we are part of nature, the beings through which nature is becoming 
conscious of itself. In doing so, he rejected Fichte’s assumption that our 
concepts of nature emerge simply as means to enable us to impose our will 
upon it (Gare 2017a, 59ff.) and Hegel’s claim that nature is posited by Spirit as 
its Other. The process of understanding the development of cognition through 
which the concepts by which we understand the world, defended by Fichte 
against Kant’s strictures on what we can know, was extended by Schelling to 
include the whole of nature. On this basis, Schelling challenged Newtonian 
physics, arguing for a speculative physics that could make intelligible the 
process by which nature had evolved and humanity had evolved within nature 
with all the characteristics ascribed to humanity by Fichte and Hegel (Schelling, 
2004, 193ff.). Nature was thus conceived as unconscious mind and mind, 
conscious nature, with nature as activity constructing itself, evolving through 
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successive limiting of this activity (Schelling, 2004, 17). While this was not fully 
developed by him, Schelling built on the dynamism that Kant had defended, 
and argued that nature must be essentially active and productive, that is, it 
must consist of ‘productivity/products’ with these being indissociable since 
without productivity, there could be no products, and without products, 
productivity would be unintelligible. The most basic units of this productivity 
are actants, corresponding to Whitehead’s actual occasions. These are not in 
space but prior to space (Schelling, 2004, 22) and are able to combine by 
prehending each other (p.24). Such productivity of actants engenders opposing 
forces that limit activity, leading to products the forms of which are a 
consequence of the balance between opposing forces. However, with life, there 
is no such balance and living organisms while being products of their 
environments have to actively maintain their form against the forces in their 
environments through engaging with their environments. It is by virtue of this 
duplicity that their environments become meaningful worlds for them (p.112n*). 
Humans develop through further limiting their activity in recognizing the 
freedom of each other, and holding each other responsible for their actions. 
Allowing for evolution and the development of cognition through successive 
limiting of activity and the possibility of comprehending this evolution involved 
rejecting the claim of Kant that nature must be completely comprehensible 
through mathematics. However, this did not involve rejecting mathematics but 
a call for new developments in mathematics adequate to a dynamic nature and 
life (Gare, 2013). On the basis of all this, Schelling was able to defend and 
develop the conception of humanity and of Spirit that had been developed by 
Herder, Fichte and Hegel.  
THE SCHELLINGIAN TRADITION, PROCESS METAPHYSICS AND 
SCIENCE 
Schelling began what I have argued is the modern tradition of process 
philosophy through this strategy of focussing on life, consciousness, mind or 
Spirit, attempting to do full justice to them, and then demanding of the natural 
sciences that they be transformed to make intelligible the existence of life and 
human consciousness within nature (Gare, 2011). The same approach was 
embraced by the leading figures of process philosophy at the end of the 
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nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, including C.S. 
Peirce, William James, Henri Bergson, Aleksandr Bogdanov, John Dewey, 
George Herbert Mead and Alfred North Whitehead, and with the 
development of phenomenology, by the philosophical biologists and 
philosophical anthropologists inspired by Max Scheler. This was continued 
through the efforts to naturalize phenomenology following Merleau-Ponty and 
Varela. It was also the strategy of thinkers who began as neo-Kantians, but 
who could be thought of as contributing to the tradition of process thought, 
most importantly, Ernst Cassirer with his work on the philosophy of science 
and mathematics, and Jean Piaget with his work on developmental psychology, 
ethology and his genetic structuralism. The development of biosemiotics and 
biohermeneutics exemplifies a more recent application of this approach. 
Having such a common approach constitutes these thinkers as a tradition, 
although influences of different thinkers in this tradition on each other was 
often indirect. What has not been appreciated, even by Alfred North 
Whitehead, is the enormous influence this tradition had on the development of 
science and mathematics as well as the arts and humanities. 
The failure to appreciate the influence of this tradition on science and 
mathematics is due to the distortion of the history of science by the heirs of the 
Seventeenth Century scientific revolution, the scientific materialists. The 
Romantics called for a mathematics adequate to the fluidity of nature (Heuser, 
2016). Their influence can be traced through Hermann Grassmann’s extension 
theory that anticipated most of the mathematics of modern physics,  through 
his influence on Alfred North Whitehead’s effort to develop a universal algebra, 
and then to category theory that is at present challenging set theory as the 
foundation for mathematics (Gare, 2013). Schelling’s characterization of being 
as essentially activity contributed to the development of thermodynamics. As 
Thomas Kuhn (1977) showed, those who postulated the conservation of energy, 
including Hermann von Helmholz who helped found neo-Kantianism to 
oppose the influence of Schellingian thought, were influenced by Schelling. It 
was the Romantics who believed that light, electricity and magnetism would be 
shown to be related in a science that could displace Newtonian science, and the 
development of field theory by Faraday and Maxwell was really the triumph of 
this project. Faraday’s ideas were developed in Schelling’s lifetime, and were 
enthusiastically endorsed by him as the realization of his philosophy of nature 
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(Mainzer, 1996, 269f.). The idea that different chemicals were not substances 
but only relatively stable structures maintained through a balance of opposing 
forces derived from Schelling. Karl Ernst von Baer’s work on embryology was a 
development of the tradition of Naturphilosophie. Jacob von Uexküll’s argument 
that organisms can only be understood within their environments defined 
through function circles as having meaning for them, drew upon Kant rather 
than Schelling, but going beyond Kant to acknowledge that all organisms, not 
only humans, constitute their environments as worlds, had already been argued 
by Schelling (2004, p.106ff.). Despite Darwin’s efforts to make evolutionary 
theory accord with Newtonian science, the notion of evolution was really a 
revival of the Romantic notion of evolution promoted by Schelling (Richards, 
2002, chap.14) and as Whitehead pointed out, evolution is unintelligible from 
the perspective of scientific materialism. While mainstream evolutionary theory 
aligned with biochemistry and molecular biology continued this project, the 
more important advances in biology, that is, the advances that actually made 
the reality of life more intelligible, came from those reacting against 
reductionist thought such as von Bertalanffy and C.H. Waddington and those 
they influenced. This involved not only giving a place to epigenesis, but also to 
organisms defining their environments as their worlds, in interaction with each 
other to cooperatively augment their environments, creating ecosystems with 
their own dynamics. Only in this context, these theorists argued, could 
evolution and the struggle for survival be understood. 
The influence of the Romantics permeated the work of many of those who 
established psychology as a science. The later work of Darwin on humans 
manifest the influence on him of the Romantic tradition of thought. Helmholtz 
who called for a return to Kant to uphold the Newtonian tradition of the 
natural sciences, and his student Wilhelm Wundt, sometimes claimed to be the 
founder of the science of psychology in Germany, were also strongly influenced 
by the Romantic tradition. Wundt was influenced by Herder, Hegel and 
Wilhelm von Humboldt and gave a central place to consciousness, and wrote 
on cultural psychology, understood in a very broad sense to include all facets of 
social life. C.S. Peirce’s work in psychology and William James’ Principles of  
Psychology (1990) were very much in the tradition of Schellingian thought. Even 
Freud’s notion of the unconscious can be traced back to the influence of 
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Schelling. The phenomenological tradition founded by Edmund Husserl is 
usually taken to have originated in the descriptive psychology of Franz 
Brentano based on a return to Aristotle rather than to Kant. However, Husserl 
was also influenced by William James, Henri Bergson and the neo-Kantians, 
and his work facilitated a revival of interest in the work of those philosophers 
influenced by Schelling, such as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. His 
characterization of the development of cognition echoed the work of Fichte, as 
has been noted.  
Gestalt psychology founded by Carl Stumpf, rejecting atomistic thinking, 
arguing that in perception the whole is more than the sum of its parts and 
concerned with the mind as self-organizing, was also seen as influenced by 
Brentano. But this movement also was influenced by a wider range of thinkers. 
Stumpf’s grandfather had studied the philosophies of Kant and Schelling, and 
this background clearly influenced Stumpf’s work. The Gestalt psychologists 
ascribed this self-organizing tendency to the brain, and following the use of the 
concept of field in physics, Wolfgang Köhler characterized the wholes they 
studied as fields. Kurt Goldstein extended Gestalt psychology to neuroscience. 
Jean Piaget objected to the focus of the Gestalt psychologists on achieving 
equilibrium to the exclusion of development, and to overcome this, developed 
his genetic structuralist theory of cognitive development to show how cognition 
develops from babies to adults. His later work on ethology was influence by von 
Uexküll. Piaget’s theory of cognitive development has also been compared to 
Fichte’s, and his extension of this to animals, along with efforts to characterize 
mathematics, again echoes Schelling (Gare 2017a, 84 ). Merleau-Ponty, who 
late in his career revived natural philosophy, turning to the work of Bergson, 
Schelling and Whitehead as well as to developments in the physics (Merleau-
Ponty, 2003), work that inspired later efforts to naturalize phenomenology, 
from the beginning of his career drew upon the work of the Gestalt 
psychologists, including Goldstein and von Uexküll, and also Piaget.  
In all cases, humans were portrayed as being essentially social, not only 
through being part of societies, but only becoming human through being 
socialized or encultured into historically formed and historically developing 
communities, defining themselves through mutual recognition in the context of 
institutions, communicating through socially formed languages and controlling 
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their situations through tools, technologies and built-up environments. That is, 
they were understood as Hegel had characterized humans. Social sciences that 
conceived humans in this way were defended against the atomic individualism 
promoted by mainstream economists and psychologists. Sociologists, following 
Pitirim Sorokin, analysed societies into through three dimensions of 
personality, society and culture, each being essential to and a condition of the 
other two. This corresponded to Hegel’s philosophy of Spirit or Geist according 
to which there is Subjective Spirit, Objective Spirit and Absolute Spirit. By 
developing these as sciences they should be seen as justifying Schelling’s 
naturalism and seen humanity as part of nature. On this basis, it could be 
argued that if the human sciences are to advance, human ecology should 
become the central human science through which all other human sciences can 
be related to each other and put into perspective.  
When all such scientific work is considered together, it is should be evident 
that the quest to overcome scientific materialism that began with the Early 
Romantics has been the driving force of both the natural and the human 
sciences from the early nineteenth century onwards. Reductionist thinking has 
proceeded by attempting to account for the observations and insights of the 
Schellingian challenge to scientific materialism by interpreting these in terms 
commensurate with Newtonian science, and generally, have failed. In some 
cases this has been productive, as when Heinrich Hertz, Helmholtz’s student, 
in his effort to reformulate physics from a neo-Kantian/Newtonian perspective 
to oppose the work of Faraday and Maxwell, set out to refute Maxwell by 
showing that the implications of his work were mistaken, and discovered radio 
waves. While orthodox reductionist biology, by effectively explaining away life 
rendered itself incoherent, understanding the struggle for survival and the study 
of the chemistry of life did advance biology. However, the effect of the 
continued domination of assumptions deriving from Cartesian and Newtonian 
science fragmented the advances in post-Cartesian, post-Newtonian science. 
The development of field theory in physics has been hindered by a constant 
tendency to privilege particles. Rodney Brooks in a recent book, Fields of  Color 
(2016) in which he defended the quantum field theory of Julian Schwinger and 
Hideki Yukawa against Feynman, Schrödinger and de Broglie against Born, 
Heisenberg and Dirac, and Lorenz against Einstein, noted that in each case 
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those defending the primacy of particles prevailed over those defending fields. 
This constant tendency to translate field theories in terms of particles, he 
argued, is responsible for the apparent incomprehensibility of quantum theory. 
Thermodynamics has been hindered by the assumption that ultimately its laws 
will be explained by statistical mechanics despite the impossibility of explaining 
phase transitions in this way. Advances in quantum chemistry have been 
limited because of the assumption of chemists that they are dealing with 
nothing but particles and the bonds between them. Post-reductionist biologists 
are hindered by not being able to take full advantage of the advances in the 
physical sciences. And the human sciences, even when anti-reductionist, have a 
tendency to privilege objectifying forms of thought that render the notion of 
humans as subjects creating themselves though history, unintelligible.  
EXPLAINING CONSCIOUSNESS THROUGH PROCESS PHILOSOPHY 
With this background it should become evident that developing science in a 
way that makes consciousness intelligible will require us to not only reject 
reductionist scientific materialism as incapable of comprehending 
consciousness. It will involve a radical transformation of what we take the 
sciences to be. It means rejecting the tacitly held assumption of those who take 
the reality of consciousness seriously that it is a Cartesian thinking thing or 
thinking subject. It means embracing the German notion Geist for mind and 
conceiving of the mind as Spirit as characterized by Hegel and Schelling, and 
conceiving consciousness in relation to this. Thinking of consciousness in this 
way involves first of all seeing human consciousness as integrally related to 
culturally formed communities and their histories, and involves multiple levels 
of feeling and awareness as well as focal consciousness. Spirit (Geist) is the 
moving force of humanity advancing humanity’s understanding of itself as 
central to its own self-creation, while following Schelling, seeing humanity as 
part of nature and therefore part of the self-formation of nature. It is through 
human Spirit, which includes culture, institutions and technology as well as the 
embodied, conscious subjects who undertake research and develop ideas, that 
nature is reaching higher levels of self-understanding.  
It is also necessary to understand what is involved in consciousness being 
embodied as part of nature. As Schelling, then von Uexküll and the 
phenomenologists argued, it involves being an organism that defines its 
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environment as its world, and acts on the basis of how this world is defined. In 
the case of humans with their capacity to see the world from the perspective of 
others, this world is a with-world, a world shared with others, and it is by virtue 
of this that it is an historical world transcending the lives of any particular 
individual. This also facilitates the capacity of humans to reflect upon 
themselves and their understanding of themselves, developing a self-world. As 
the semioticians have argued, all these processes are semiotic processes; that is, 
forms of semiosis, with the most thoroughly worked out characterization of 
semiosis having been provided by C.S. Peirce, who characterized himself as a 
Schellingian of some stripe (Gare, 2009). What made Peirce’s theory of semiosis 
superior is that he understood semiosis as triadic, involving a sign, an object 
and an interpretant in a way that can be interpreted as involving the limiting of 
activity. This very general characterization of signs enabled the growth of 
organisms and their actions as well as thoughts to be understood as semiotic 
processes, with vegetative growth, actions and ideas being conceived of as 
interpretants, with thoughts presupposing the capacity to act and action 
presupposing vegetative semiosis (Kull, 2009). Semiotics is also central to 
ecosystems. As Kalevi Kull argued, the bonds of ecosystems, including the 
global ecosystem, are semiotic bonds (Kull, 2010). From this perspective, the 
development of human culture associated with the development of human 
Spirit, including the institutional, architectural and technological forms and 
infrastructure that cultures sustain, is part of the development of the 
semiosphere as characterized by Jesper Hoffmeyer.  
For orthodox Peircians, this theory of semiotics solves all problems of 
science and philosophy since we can regard semiosis as ubiquitous and the 
whole of reality as nothing but semiosis. Since natural processes always involve 
semiosis and interpretants, all of nature involves different degrees of 
consciousness. This has been contested by other semioticians, such as Marcello 
Barbieri (2008), who argue that semiosis originates with life, and there can be 
semiosis at a basic level of life without anything like consciousness. To reveal 
where consciousness comes in, it is necessary to unpack what has been enfolded 
from Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy into Peirce’s notion of interpretant. 
It is here that Piaget’s work is relevant, since his notion of structures 
assimilating and accommodating to their environments, based on Kant’s notion 
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of schema, provides a better appreciation of what is consciousness. This is 
especially the case when Piaget’s notions are further developed through 
Merleau-Ponty’s post-phenomenology and Mark Johnson’s (1987) and George 
Lakoff’s (1987) work in cognitive science, which also facilitate an appreciation of 
the role of body schema, metaphors and narratives in cognition, the 
development of culture and individual consciousness. 
The problem then becomes how to explain the possibility of these semiotic 
and cognitive processes through the physical sciences. Here it is important to 
keep in mind what has been argued above, that that most of the major 
advances in science since the middle of the nineteenth century have been 
inspired by efforts, following Schelling, to conceive nature is a way that would 
make consciousness intelligible. To put these advances in science in perspective 
from a Schellingian perspective it is best to work from the reality of self-
conscious Spirit down. Consciousness must be acknowledged as part of nature 
by science because to deny it is a performative contradiction. And as Robert 
Rosen noted, whenever biology has come into conflict with physics, it is physics 
that has turned out to be wrong and has had to give ground. So, discussing 
consciousness, it is better to look at Spirit before biology and biology before 
chemistry and physics. Along with work in biosemiotics, the developments in 
theoretical biology that can grant a place to Spirit are those inspired by 
Whitehead, most importantly, the work of the mathematico-physico-chemical 
morphologists led by C.H. Waddington and Joseph Needham. Under the 
influence of Whitehead’s notion of concrescence, Waddington developed the 
concept of ‘chreod’, or necessary path, along with the concept of homeorhesis, 
the process by which a developing system returns to its path of development 
after perturbations. There are hierarchies of paths, as with an embryo as a 
whole and its differentiated parts, and there are possibilities of taking different 
paths, with various degrees of difficulty in shifting from one path to another. 
Waddington modelled these paths as landscapes with paths represented as 
valleys and the difficulty of shifting from one path to another as ridges between 
the valleys. René Thom formalized these representations through differential 
geometry, introducing the notion of catastrophe into mathematics to 
characterize moving from one path to another. These concepts were utilized to 
characterize the development of embryos, but proved useful in diverse 
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disciplines. As both Waddington and Piaget realized, these concepts were 
applicable to comprehending cognitive development and cognitive activities, 
and Thom applied them to developing a theory of semiotics that influenced 
Barbieri.  
LIFE, THERMODYNAMICS AND QUANTUM FIELD THEORY 
The question such work raises is how chreods and homeorhesis are possible. 
Various efforts to explain these have been made, but a common feature of 
them is that they accord a central role to oscillations and their entrainment. It 
is by virtue of oscillations in a developing embryo that cells recognize their 
position and role. Oscillations are functioning as signs. Oscillations in turn 
involve energy and its transformations. Ilya Prigogine, who used his work on 
dissipative systems engendered by far from thermodynamically equilibrium 
systems to explain life, showed that oscillations, that is, fluctuations in 
concentrations of the chemical acrasin, can explain the transformation of the 
slime mould from a collection of individual cells into a differentiated organism 
with a foot, stalk and spore pod (Prigogine, 1976). Oscillations developing as 
components of dissipative structures account for vegetative semiosis. Those 
developing these ideas are generally seen to be challenging the work of the 
biochemists and molecular biologists with their reductionist program, but 
Candace Pert, examining the nature and role of chemicals in the relationship 
between ligands and receptors, has shown that these can only be understood 
through frequencies of oscillation and entrainment of oscillations. On this basis 
she showed that polypeptides are able to account for memory and emotion in 
organisms (Pert, 2003).  
What is crucial for understanding how these oscillations can effect 
significant changes is work on how systems organize to a state of criticality such 
that a very small input can trigger major transformations. This involves storing 
usable energy, and one of the pioneers of biophysics, Herbert Fröhlich (1977), 
showed how such storage can take place through various kinds of oscillations, 
that these oscillations could account for the coherence of organisms, and 
electric dipole oscillations associated with water could be propagated as 
coherent waves along filaments within cells without thermal loss. Building on 
this work, Mae-Wan Ho (2008; 2012) pointed out that organized heterogeneity 
can involve the creation of a hierarchy of near-equilibrium regimes despite the 
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whole being far from equilibrium, thus maximizing the efficiency of energy 
transformations. Organisms are excitable media poised to respond to specific 
signals disproportionately because large amounts of energy are available to 
amplify small, weak signals, often into macroscopic action. 
Thermodynamics and chemistry are not enough by themselves to explain 
how these oscillations engender consciousness, however. This requires recourse 
to further developments in physics. I have already noted that the development 
of electro-magnetic field theory explaining light emerged out of the research 
program of the Early Romantics, and particularly Schelling, to replace 
Newtonian physics that made consciousness unintelligible, with a form of 
physics compatible with the reality of mind and consciousness. Claiming that 
electro-magnetic fields are somehow involved in consciousness can facilitate an 
explanation of consciousness should not be seen as surprising. However, later 
developments in physics stood in the way of this conclusion. One was the 
reconceptualization of fields in a way that denied any reality to temporal 
becoming, the other was the development of quantum mechanics and the 
reinstatement of particles to the centre of theoretical physics. As I noted above, 
particles tend to be privileged over fields in physics despite the continued use of 
the language of fields. We speak of elementary particle physics, not elementary 
field physics. However, there is no reason to accept this way of interpreting 
advances in physics, and quantum field theorists have reasserted the primary 
reality of fields, with so-called particles seen as perturbations of fields. This is 
really how Whitehead, whose first work was a study of Maxwell’s equations, 
was interpreting fields, with his notion of actual occasions being quanta of fields 
conceived in such a way as to grant a place to subjectivity and choice as well as 
objectivity. 
A number of theorists have invoked quantum theory to account for 
consciousness. The most well known of these are Roger Penrose and Stuart 
Hammeroff, drawing upon Penrose’s own work in physics, Henry Stapp who 
has interpreted John von Neumann’s interpretation of quantum theory through 
Whitehead’s philosophy to explain experience as it was described by William 
James (Stapp, 2009, 9ff.), and David Bohm, whose early work and later work 
have influenced different theorists in neuroscience, most importantly in my 
view, Paavo Pylkkänen (2007). However, here I want to draw on the work of 
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Hiroomi Umezawa (the successor to Yukawa as Japan’s leading theoretical 
physicist), and those he influenced. This includes Mari Jibu and Kunio Yasue, 
and the Italian theoretical physicist, Giuseppe Vitiello (Globus, Pribram and 
Vitiello, 2004). Umezawa was concerned to advance quantum field theory by 
incorporating thermodynamics, and Vitiello continued this project. Umezawa, 
Jibu and Yasue applied these advances in quantum field theory to 
neuroscience, developing quantum brain dynamics. This work was embraced 
by Karl Pribram and his student, Walter Freeman, both concerned to 
overcome the limitations of brain science based on the assumption that all 
important brain activity is associated with the electro-chemical activity of 
neurons and neural nets. Vitiello went on to develop a dissipative quantum 
model of the brain (Vitiello, 2001). This work has influenced Gordon Globus 
(2009) who has attempted to interpret their work through Whitehead’s and 
Heidegger’s philosophies. 
Quantum theory has been invoked by neuroscientists not only because it 
might make the reality of consciousness more intelligible, but also because the 
brain and the body generally has an enduring coherence in its functioning that 
cannot be accounted for through the chemistry of nerve impulses. These are 
too slow. Nor can mainstream neuroscience account for long term memory, 
given that biomolecules are continually being broken down and reconstructed 
every few weeks. However, those drawing on quantum theory have been 
vigorously opposed, and this opposition was consolidated by an influential 
paper by Max Tegmark (2000) claiming that at body temperature the quantum 
coherence required to explain this neural coherence could not last anywhere 
near long enough to do so. Thermal noise would lead very rapidly to 
decoherence. While Penrose and Hammeroff claimed that the water bound up 
in microtubules is insulated from thermal noise, Umezawa pointed out the 
argument was invalid against quantum fields achieving this integration. As he 
pointed out, neither neurons nor other brain cells are treated as quantum 
objects, and the quantum variables are basic field variables (Vitiello, 2001, 86). 
Tegmark has revealed the limits of quantum mechanics, and thereby why it is 
necessary to use quantum field theory to understand the brain, Vitiello argued.  
While Umezawa was concerned primarily with showing how the quantum 
vacuum in quantum field theory could serve memory, Mari Jibu and Kunio 
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Yasue (1995) characterized quantum brain dynamics as the quantum 
electrodynamics of the electric dipole field of dipolar solitons and water 
molecules bound within the cytoskeletons of cells, postulating a ‘cortical field’ 
and ‘corticons’ as cortical field bosons. Asking ”What is mind?” and “What is 
Life?” they proclaimed, ‘We will address these two issue from the new point of 
view that water is the fundamental constituent of  both life and consciousness’ (p.158). 
Building on this work, Freeman and Vitiello argued: 
The common belief is that, if physics has to be involved in the description of 
brain dynamics, classical tools such as non-linear dynamics and statistical 
mechanics should suffice. However, many-body field theory appears to us as the 
only existing theoretical tool capable to explain the dynamic origin of long-range 
correlations, their rapid and efficient formation and dissolution, their interim 
stability in ground states, the multiplicity of coexisting and possibly non-
interfering ground states, their degree of ordering, and their rich textures. It is 
historical fact that many-body quantum field theory has been devised and 
constructed in past decades exactly to understand features like ordered pattern 
formation and phase transitions in condensed matter physics, similar to those in 
the brains, that could not be understood in classical physics. (Freeman and 
Vitiello, 2006, 96) 
Freeman and Vitiello continued their collaboration to develop these ideas to 
show the relationship between mind and quantized fields (Freeman and 
Vitiello, 2016a and 2016b). 
Apparently independently of this school of thought, Mae-Wan Ho also 
defended a central role quantum coherence and for the role of water in 
facilitating this. She also claimed that quantum coherence associated with 
water is central to consciousness. Her work has been ignored by mainstream 
scientists, partly because of the boldness of her claims for the role of quantum 
coherence in biological organization and in the emergence of consciousness. If 
the claims of Penrose and Hammeroff can be challenged, then Ho’s 
speculations about quantum coherence place her outside what can be taken 
seriously.  
However, Ho’s views differed from those of the proponents of quantum 
brain dynamics (see Gare, 2017b). Her work manifest her commitment to 
Whiteheadian and Bergsonian process ontology. She characterized her own 
work as ‘a Whiteheadian “process” view in which organisms are seen not as the 
consequence of natural selection of past random mutations but as dynamic 
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structures which are immanent and simultaneous with process.’ On this view, 
‘The organism, as well as the human observer as organism, are firmly located 
within nature where they are empowered to shape their own evolution and 
destiny’ (Ho and Fox, 1988, 14). She also embraced Henri Bergson’s ‘intuition 
of inner organic time of “pure duration” as a dynamic heterogeneous 
multiplicity of succession without separateness’ which, she argued, ‘the 
advances in neuroscience over the last two decades have borne out’ (Ho, 2008, 
320).  On the basis of these ontological commitments, she argued that too much 
emphasis had been placed on the brain and the central nervous system and 
argued that consciousness should be seen in relation to the whole body of 
organisms, which she characterized as quantum coherent liquid crystals. As she 
put it: 
Body consciousness possessing all the hallmarks of consciousness – sentience, 
intercommunication and memory – is distributed throughout the entire liquid 
crystalline matrix that connects each single cell to every other. Brain 
consciousness associated with the nervous system is embedded in body 
consciousness and is coupled to it. (Ho, 2008, 237). 
The work of Umezawa and those he influenced provides strong support for 
such conjectures. While focusing on the brain, Umezawa, Jibu, Yasue and 
Vitiello acknowledged that there was no reason for not acknowledging that the 
whole body could function as a coherent quantum field, although except in 
rare asides, they did not develop this insight (Vitiello, 2001, 92). 
While Ho did not attempt this, the importance of this approach is that it 
can be embraced and used by proponents of the microgenetic theory of 
consciousness. Building on the work of the Leipzig school of Gestalt psychology 
and examining the actual genesis of the various forms of differentiation of 
experience into separate sensations, perceptions, distinct acts of remembering, 
distinct thoughts, and so on, they argue and have provided a great deal of 
evidence for their claim that such differentiation culminating in the higher 
forms of self-reflexive consciousness are built on and presuppose the more 
primitive and immediate forms of cognition as inchoate, pre-conscious felt 
dispositions (Bachmann, 2000, chap.1). Each act of cognition up to and 
including language and reflective self-consciousness, unfolds through moulding 
the more basic and more global forms of cognition to achieve greater specificity 
to achieve these more advanced, focussed and more detached forms of 
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cognition. Jason Brown (2015, 49) concluded that it is necessary to invoke 
Whitehead’s notion of causation in which what comes later in a sense 
incorporates what comes earlier (as for instance the meaning of a sentence 
understood at the end of the sentence incorporates the earlier parts of the 
sentence) to explain such cognition.  
RETHINKING THE SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS THROUGH ROBERT 
ROSEN 
Does this mean we should accept the identification of consciousness with 
coherent quantum fields of liquid crystals? What is the relationship between 
such physical processes and Spirit as characterized by Hegel? Those defending 
quantum theory have shown that tranquilizers work by interfering with the 
quantum coherent fields associated with water in microtubules, so it is 
reasonable to believe that these fields are inseparable from consciousness, but 
to claim that these fields are consciousness is like claiming that since cars 
cannot function without sparkplugs, the life of cars must be in its sparkplugs. It 
is best to interpret work on the role of quantum coherent liquid crystals in 
terms of the whole tradition of process metaphysics and corresponding 
advances in science as these have developed since Schelling wrote his major 
work on the philosophy of nature in 1799 (Gare, 2013). 
One of the most important insights of Schelling was that the evolution of 
nature, involving emergence of higher and higher levels of organization leading 
up to human consciousness and the development of Spirit, as noted above, 
involved, counter-intuitively, limiting activity (Schelling, 2004, 17). Once 
postulated, this is obvious. Atoms limit the components of their nuclei and their 
electrons to reproduce themselves, and it is by virtue of these limitations that 
neutrons are stable and atoms have their valency and powers and liabilities. 
The activities of chemicals in a living organism are similarly limited to serve the 
maintenance, development and reproduction of the organism. This insight was 
rediscovered by Howard Pattee in the 1960s and 70s (Pattee, 1973; Pattee, 2012), 
who referred to constrains rather than limits. Pattee was primarily concerned to 
explain how molecules become messages, and his work on this was initially 
associated with dealing with the measurement problem in quantum theory 
before being generalized to theoretical biology and social theory. Pattee’s work 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 258 
was taken up and further developed by the theoretical ecologist Tim Allen 
(Allen and Starr, 1982) and the theoretical biologist Stan Salthe (1993). 
Generally, hierarchy theory was developed as a means to advance general 
systems theory and complexity theory. However, if we relate this work on 
constraints back to the Schellingian tradition of process thought, it would be 
more fruitful to think in terms of emergent fields rather than systems, 
immediately focusing attention on balances or imbalances of opposing forces in 
producing, maintaining and developing fields. 
This not only aligns this idea with the theoretical biology of Waddington 
and the notion of chreod which presupposed the notion or the biofield 
(originating with Alexander Gurwitsch), but also makes it easier to relate 
biology to advances in physics. The fruitfulness of the notion of field has been 
demonstrated by Alexander Gurwitsch with his notion of the biofield, by Brian 
Goodwin with his notion of the morphogenetic fields developed in his work on 
embryology, by Mari Jibu and Kunio Yasue in developing the notion of the 
cortical field, by Gestalt psychologists with their notion of the perceptual field, 
and by Kurt Lewin and Pierre Bourdieu in their social theory based on the 
notion of social and cultural fields. As I have shown elsewhere, it provides the 
means for integrating Piaget’s genetic structuralism and Peircian semiotics, and 
for understanding the nature of human culture and social dynamics (Gare, 
2017a). And as Joseph Bracken has argued, the notion of fields is required to 
overcome the atomistic tendencies of Whitehead’s formulation of process 
philosophy in Process and Reality (Bracken, 1994). 
  However, field theory and hierarchy theory are not enough by themselves 
to comprehend life and mind. Robert Rosen, who initially worked with Pattee 
in developing hierarchy theory, found this inadequate to do full justice to the 
reality of life itself. Through his work on mathematical modelling using 
category theory according to which what is being modelled is causal 
entailments, he realized that anticipatory systems, which must have models of 
themselves in their environment, must be seen to consist of a number of 
processes that are components of each other but are not reducible to each other 
(2012). Consequently, there is no largest model of such systems through which 
models of its components can be deduced. Multiple models, each being 
components of and presupposed by the others, are required. This work had far 
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reaching implications because it reveals the impossibility of identifying the 
functions into which an anticipatory system can be analysed with their 
fractionated components, for instance, the electromagnetic and chemical 
processes and transformations that make up an organism. From this it should 
be evident that it is impossible to identify consciousness with quantum coherent 
fields of liquid crystals (Rosen, 2000).  
This does not mean that quantum coherent liquid crystals are not essential 
to there being consciousness. Just as the chemical structures that give strength 
to bones are essential to these bones, quantum coherent liquid crystals 
organized at multiple levels are essential to organizational and psychological 
memory, coordinating growth, maintaining coherence in organisms, and 
enabling them to interpret their environments and then actively engage in their 
worlds, that is, to be aware and then conscious.  
To begin with, the quantum coherent fields of liquid crystals are involved in 
consciousness because they encode memory in a way that they are able to 
trigger and coordinate cascades of energetic transformations, as when 
organisms leap into action in response to sensed danger. They are able to serve 
their role because of the complexity with which they can be modulated while at 
the same time preserving stability, while interacting with other fields, such as 
those associated with polypeptides formed in cytoskeletons, particularly those of 
neurons. It appears that the quantum field vacuum states and polypeptides, 
situated within dissipative systems constantly exchanging energy with their 
environments, serve the development of memory. However, memory is not 
merely recordings but the capacity to relate the past to present circumstances 
and to respond to these and to anticipated futures. Following Peirce and the 
biosemioticians, it is best to think of this as semiosis, including vegetative, 
animal and symbolic semiosis through which environments come to be sensed 
or experienced as meaningful worlds. Semiosis operates in these 
transformations at multiple levels. In serving to make memory possible, these 
quantum coherent fields should be seen not simply in relation to the whole 
organism rather than just the brain, but to the organism in its environment.  
The development of a proprioceptive sense is crucial to animals, that unlike 
plants, can move in their environments. This is associated with differentiating 
the organism from its ambience with which it is engaged, which then become 
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the world of the organism. While in the case of most organisms that are capable 
of consciousness, this does not involve recognition that their world is 
independent of their perspectives on it. However, organisms have co-evolved 
with other organisms and what they are sensitive to and can respond to is 
largely determined by the ecosystems within which they have evolved. 
Ecosystems have evolved through the evolution of semiotic bonds between 
organisms and these are major components of the worlds of each organism. 
Humans also have the capacity to view the world from the perspective of 
others, developing their with-worlds. Their ambience or environment is an 
environment transformed by humans over their history into a shared, 
transformed world; a built-up environment. Memory and anticipation are 
augmented by the capacity to participate in linguistically mediated 
communication, whether speaking and listening, or reading and writing, and 
joint projects, sometimes organized over many generations, such as building a 
city, advancing science, building a nation, or building a global civilization. 
These are represented by shared narratives which being embraced function as 
facilitative or enabling constraints, making heroic actions and endeavors and 
new achievements possible. That is, civilized living involves participating in 
Objective and Absolute Spirit in a grand narrative as characterized by Hegel, 
constraining oneself in the quest for beauty, justice and truth. Rethinking Hegel 
through Schelling, Whitehead and Peirce, Objective and Absolute Spirit can be 
situated within the global ecosystem, and seen as a development of the global 
semiosphere whereby nature through us is reaching higher and higher levels of 
self-understanding. At the same time, this is an advance of process philosophy, 
the humanities and science. 
CONCLUSION 
Understanding the relationship between quantum coherent liquid crystals and 
human consciousness understood within the context of ecosystems is facilitated 
by Rosen’s work, showing that processes can be components of each other 
while being irreducible to each other. This is how Hegel understood the 
relationship between the dialectics of representation, recognition and labour, 
and the relationship between Objective Spirit, Absolute Spirit and Subjective 
Spirit. Clearly, consciousness is associated with Subjective Spirit, but Objective 
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Spirit (institutions and their material supports) and Absolute Spirit (culture, pre-
eminently the dialectic of representation whereby humans develop their 
understanding of themselves and their world) are components of Subjective 
Spirit, and central to human consciousness. By being inspired by participation 
in these, people are constrained to play roles in institutions and to participate in 
appropriating and advancing their understanding of themselves, other people, 
societies and the rest of nature. This can be characterized as the constraints 
associated with semiosis, evident when people accept the constraints of 
grammar to communicate, or the more severe constraints to speak only when 
appropriate, taking into account the dynamics of cultural fields in which they 
are situated. These constraints in turn are built on more basic constraints 
associated with biological existence and the maintenance of the ecosystems of 
which humans are part and within which they are participating. The advance 
of civilization is the development of consciousness and thereby Spirit, 
embracing the enabling constraints associated with having broader and 
broader perspectives, acknowledging through the dialectic of recognition 
crystalized in Objective Spirit, the significance of ever greater numbers of 
others, including other communities, societies and civilizations, and of 
ecosystems and their diverse species and members, moving towards the 
creation of a global ecological civilization, each person constraining their 
activities and productions, acting and living accordingly. This global Spirit, 
forging a new grand narrative, is slowly being incorporated by individuals, and 
is made possible by the quantum coherent fields of liquid crystals and protein 
molecules that are essential components of them. 
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